Post Quantum Computing Security

Executive Summary

As technology continues to evolve, cellular wireless network organizations face the dual challenge of integrating new innovations while ensuring they remain trustworthy and secure. At the same time, the threat landscape is expanding, with malicious actors exploiting these advancements for harmful purposes. This paper provides a high-level overview of the upcoming security and trust challenges posed by quantum computing.

It has been shown that a powerful enough quantum computer, referred to as a CRQC (Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer), coupled with Shor’s Algorithm, has the potential to break traditional public key cryptography. Needless to say, this would have devasting consequences not only for mobile networks but for the internet, as public key cryptography is a backbone component of how these networks are secured today.

While it is still unclear when a CRQC may be realized and potentially publicly revealed, some estimates suggest it could be some time in the 2030’s. Fortunately, the threat of a CRQC to traditional public key cryptography was identified many years ago and initiatives are well underway to standardize new algorithms, known as Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). PQC algorithms are believed to be resistant to both classical computing and CRQC attacks. In 2016, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) launched an initiative to solicit and evaluate PQC algorithms. After several years and testing, the first three PQC algorithms as follows were standardized in August 2024:

• • • • NIST FIPS 203 named Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism (ML-KEM)
      • NIST FIPS 204 named Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA)
      • NIST FIPS 205 named the Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (SLH-DSA)

     

   

 

NIST is also evaluating additional PQC algorithms with a target to standardize an additional set of PQC algorithms that are based on different mathematical constructs, as alternatives to the currently standardized set in case vulnerabilities are discovered. Looking ahead, the ability to easily switch between cryptographic algorithms, known as “crypto agility,” will be a crucial capability for any system.

With NIST standardized PQC algorithms now available, the next step to be addressed is the challenge of how to migrate networks from traditional public key algorithms to PQC algorithms. In the case of mobile networks, traditional public key is used extensively. Examples include security protocols such as Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Internet Protocol Security (IPSec), as well as in digital signatures. Completely replacing traditional public key cryptography with PQC right away is not considered feasible due to the complexity of the task. Therefore, the industry is evaluating a hybrid migration approach whereby security would be established using both traditional public key and PQC algorithms concurrently with one acting as a safeguard in case the other should be compromised. Various standards organizations, most notably the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), having been working on defining hybrid mechanisms which would enable the adoption of both traditional public key and PQC algorithms into their security protocols and digital signatures. This is currently ongoing work that will take performance and interoperability into account. Once this is completed, profiles of IETF specifications will be defined in Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) specifications applicable to mobile network infrastructure.

While there is still ongoing works to be completed in standards bodies such as IETF & 3GPP, stakeholders are encouraged to take action and start planning for the migration to PQC. This includes educating key executives and stakeholders on the urgency and risks, developing a cryptographic inventory of assets, conducting a risk analysis and priority assessment and engaging with suppliers and customers on roadmap plans and dependencies.